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MULTINATIONAL EXPANSION OF WORKER
COOPERATIVES AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES: MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
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IGNACIO BRETOS, ANJEL ERRASTI, AND CARMEN MARCUELLO*
Drawing on qualitative research and longitudinal data on two
Mondragon multinational cooperatives, the authors examine the
multinational expansion of these co-ops and the diffusion of the
cooperative model’s employment practices to their subsidiaries in
Brazil, China, Slovakia, France, and Poland. The results show that
international expansion can radically transform the organizational
architecture of co-ops and exacerbate dilemmas about how to put
their hallmark values into practice. Moreover, the findings reveal a
fragmented and inconsistent introduction of the cooperative model
overseas. Work organization practices are homogeneous across the
various sites, whereas job security, training, and pay equity practices
are not. Core cooperative practices (i.e., employee participation in
ownership, profit sharing, and general management) have not been
implemented in any foreign operation. The study illustrates how
market influences, institutions, and macro- and micro-politics shape
the transfer of employment practices.
O ver the past two decades or so, an increasing range of organizationsthat are not simply capitalist firms driven by shareholder value, such
as state-owned enterprises, firms controlled by sovereign wealth funds,
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family-owned businesses, and nonprofits, have been expanding beyond their
traditional national boundaries (e.g., Chen, Saarenketo, and Puumalainen
2017). A prominent example is the case of worker cooperatives (WCs),
which are usually portrayed as small locally owned and democratically man-
aged firms, and regarded as the highest expression of participation from
employees because they contribute both labor and capital (Cheney, Santa
Cruz, Peredo, and Nazareno 2014). Globalization pressures, however, have
compelled many WCs to turn into multinational companies (MNCs) to
maintain their competitiveness (McMurtry and Reed 2009). In the absence
of statistics on the percentage of overall foreign direct investment that
is accounted for by cooperatives, recent reports by the International
Co-operative Alliance on the economic weight of the 300 largest co-ops in the
world (see ICA 2016) demonstrate that the international expansion of coop-
eratives is a far from marginal phenomenon. Approximately 90% of those 300
co-ops operate across borders (Bretos, Dı´az-Foncea, and Marcuello 2018).
In light of this, several scholars have called for an exploration of WC
internationalization and of the possibilities of reproducing the cooperative
model in subsidiaries (e.g., Bretos and Marcuello 2017; Cheney et al. 2014).
Accordingly, two research questions guide this study: 1) How do WCs con-
duct the multinational expansion process and how does this affect their
organizational architecture? 2) What tensions surround the transfer of the
cooperative model to foreign subsidiaries? To address these questions, we
provide a qualitative study of Fagor Electrodomesticos and Fagor Ederlan,
two multinational WCs belonging to the Mondragon Cooperative
Corporation (henceforth MCC). In accounting for transfer of the coopera-
tive model, we focus on the core practices that distinguish WCs, that is,
worker participation in ownership, profit sharing, and general management
(i.e., worker involvement in decision making at the strategic management
level). We also investigate other human resource (HR) practices inherent
to WCs, including job security, extended training, teamwork, information
sharing, and pay equity (Lertxundi 2011).
We contribute to the literature in three directions. First, whereas the
scant previous research on multinational co-ops has generally adopted a
paternalistic lens, both overlooking the contradictions raised by internatio-
nalization and explaining extension of the cooperative model merely in
institutionalist terms, our research provides a more detailed and critical pic-
ture that also draws attention to the role of power and interests within these
organizations. Second, our analysis of co-op multinational expansion
addresses recent appeals in international business (IB) research to explore
the internationalization of alternative organizations (Chen et al. 2017), con-
tributing as well to a growing strand of inquiry on the challenges that mar-
ket globalization entails for WCs to maintain their cooperative practices
while remaining economically efficient (e.g., Atzeni 2012). Last, by examin-
ing the transfer of HR practices within multinational co-ops, we contribute
to broadening the horizons of international human resource management
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(IHRM) beyond the hitherto exclusive consideration of shareholder-owned
MNCs (Delbridge, Hauptmeier, and Sengupta 2011). Drawing on insights
from market-based, institutionalist, and political perspectives on practice
transfer (Edwards, Colling, and Ferner 2007), our research uncovers distinc-
tive patterns in the management of labor and diffusion of employment
practices within cooperatives.
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
The IB literature contends that internationalization has become an indis-
pensable strategy for firms to stay competitive in markets, especially in situa-
tions of economic crisis (Lee and Makhija 2009). A variety of works have
analyzed internationalization strategies pursued by firms, foregrounding off-
shoring and offshore outsourcing among those of most importance
(Feenstra 2010). Whereas offshoring implies that firms relocate their busi-
ness functions to overseas locations by setting up their own centers or sub-
sidiaries, offshore outsourcing refers to the subcontracting of foreign
providers for specific activities (Kedia and Mukherjee 2009). The conse-
quences of these practices have led to a heated debate. Some scholars con-
tend that they create value for companies and for the economy as a whole
(Farrell 2005). Other studies, however, demonstrate that jobs in low-income
affiliates are substitutes for domestic jobs, whereas jobs in high-income affili-
ates are complementary (Harrison, McMillan, and Null 2007). And other
researchers argue that offshoring generates gains in terms of wages and
employment for high-skilled workers at the expense of middle- and low-
skilled workers (Oldenski 2014).
In view of this debate, some critical scholars in the field of IB studies have
emphasized that we must further our knowledge of internationalization stra-
tegies pursued by alternative organizations and determine whether such
strategies offer sustainable alternatives that consider the rights and interests
of workers (e.g., Roberts and Do¨rrenba¨cher 2016; Chen et al. 2017). WCs
have attracted some attention because these organizations are expected to
pursue the mutual benefits of the diverse stakeholders involved in cross-
border activity (Zanfei 2012). As WCs are owned and governed by workers
who are intrinsically linked to the local territory, the choice of how they
internationalize is likely to be shaped by other aspects beyond purely eco-
nomic decisions, such as the involvement of labor in management and the
social embeddedness of actors (Schro¨der 2013). Likewise, the literature
holds that WCs are expected to establish their subsidiaries as co-ops or, at
least, seek to organize abroad in an alternative way to capitalist MNCs
(Flecha and Ngai 2014). In fact, it is widely argued that the setting-up of
capitalist subsidiaries may involve drastic contradictions with the practices
and values of WCs, although little is known about how such contradictions
are constituted and how they are legitimized or contested by the diverse
organizational actors (Kasmir 2016).
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According to the IB literature, the factors shaping the internationaliza-
tion strategy will also influence the MNC organizational architecture
(Jensen, Larsen, and Pedersen 2013). A number of models have been pro-
posed to depict the balance between central control and subsidiary auton-
omy within MNCs (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998). Three basic alternatives can
be distinguished: the ‘‘global’’ MNC, in which the headquarters (HQ)
exerts strong centralized control (Ferner et al. 2013); the ‘‘multi-domestic’’
MNC, in which subsidiaries feature notable autonomy within a decentra-
lized federation (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm 2007); and the ‘‘transna-
tional’’ MNC, which attempts to secure benefits from both centralization
and decentralization (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998). The prior literature sug-
gests that the organizational architecture of multinational WCs is likely to
resemble federative models because of their actors’ social embeddedness,
alignment with local community interests, and, keeping in line with the prin-
ciples of autonomy and self-management, activities and processes are con-
trolled by those directly involved in them (McMurtry and Reed 2009; Bretos
and Marcuello 2017). Other pressures may lead WCs to lean on some centra-
lization though. A key aspect is that worker-members will logically look to
protect their job and investments in the co-op, and thus, endowing subsidiar-
ies with total autonomy may jeopardize worker-members’ control over the
capital they have invested and job stability at the HQ.
Moreover, within any given architecture, a key issue lies in the nature
and scope of the transfer of HR practices across the multinational network.
Although diffusion within global MNCs tends to take place from the HQ to
subsidiaries, transnational solutions may result in considerable multidirec-
tional transfer. Conversely, transfer is prone to be lower in multi-domestic
MNCs, because of the tendency to adopt local practices (Bjo¨rkman and
Lervik 2007). The cross-national transfer of practices in MNCs has been
addressed from three broad theoretical perspectives: market-based, institu-
tionalist, and political (Edwards et al. 2007).
The market-based view is that firms confront strong competitive pressures
from product, financial, and labor markets and, to obtain international
competitive advantages, they seek innovative best practices, which they then
try to implement in their foreign operations (Taylor, Beechler, and Napier
1996). Emulation of global best practices is prone to occur when MNCs that
stem from subordinate national business systems (NBSs), and that are defi-
cient in specialized managerial competencies, mimic best practices originat-
ing in hegemonic NBSs (Geary and Aguzzoli 2016). The second perspective
focuses on the influence of institutions in transfer, usually resorting to neo-
institutionalist theory. A crucial concept is institutional distance, which refers
to the nature of institutional differences at the regulatory (existing laws and
formal rules), normative (values, beliefs, and norms held by individuals),
and cognitive (individuals’ shared perceptions of reality) levels between the
MNC’s country of origin and the subsidiary’s country of operation (Kostova
1999). A greater institutional distance will involve a greater host country
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effect, which implies that the subsidiary’s labor practices will be shaped by
local isomorphic pulls. Conversely, the shorter the institutional distance, the
greater will be the country-of-origin effect (Quintanilla, Susaeta, and
Sa´nchez-Mangas 2008). Last, the political perspective depicts the MNC as a
contested terrain in which actors look to protect or further their own inter-
ests (Edwards and Be´langer 2009). The literature suggests that if subsidiar-
ies have power resources stemming from their local embeddedness, they
will be better positioned to resist or negotiate transfer. In addition, the HQ
also has resources to overcome institutional hurdles within the host country
and mechanisms to exert centralized control over subsidiaries, thus being
able to transfer practices at discretion (Ferner, Edwards, and Tempel 2012).
Prior research posits that WCs will draw on local rather than on overseas
practices, since they are usually integrated in local networks and seize on
communitarian social capital and native knowledge (Borzaga and Sforzi
2014). This response is especially likely to occur when co-ops are closely
linked to locally rooted consultancy firms and academic institutions (Leca,
Gond, and Cruz 2014) and when there are training structures oriented to
develop competent managers socialized in the cooperative culture, as is the
case of MCC (Basterretxea and Albizu 2011). Nevertheless, one could also
argue that WCs operating in highly competitive, globalized markets may be
compelled to import prevailing global practices and systems and enforce
them in their subsidiaries to promote productivity and economic perfor-
mance. Institutional differences are expected to have special influence on
practice transfer. A multitude of legal and cultural approaches to WCs
occur worldwide (Borzaga and Spear 2004). Likewise, WCs are embedded
in unique values and practices patterned on their respective local institu-
tional contexts (Lertxundi 2011). Both aspects may involve divergent inter-
pretations of cooperative practices among different regions, hence
complicating diffusion. Indeed, industrial relations practices and, more spe-
cifically, employee participation have been found to be particularly sensitive
to a host-country’s institutional profile (Meardi et al. 2009). Last, issues of
power and politics are likely to be relatively influential. The extant theory
suggests that WCs may embody a more harmonious terrain in which power
resources are scattered among international units and practice transfer is
aligned with the interests of the internal stakeholders located across the
multinational network—stakeholders who are expected to share similar val-
ues and establish the co-op’s policies on a consensual basis (Zanfei 2012).
That notwithstanding, it is equally evident that power imbalances and con-
flicting interests are prone to emerge if employees at subsidiaries do not
become worker-owners.
Empirical evidence on the aforementioned aspects in WCs is extremely
limited, although MCC represents one of the few exceptions. In general,
the MCC multi-localization model—in which new business activities are
opened abroad while maintaining production at home—is portrayed idylli-
cally as an alternative to dominant delocalization trends (MacLeod and
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Reed 2009), given that Mondragon global co-ops have created more
employment in the Basque Country than those that have stayed local
(Luzarraga and Irizar 2012). As remarked by Kasmir (2016), however, these
studies tell only one side of the story, ignoring the labor situation in interna-
tional subsidiaries. Only a few studies have placed more emphasis on gov-
ernance and employment relations issues in MCC’s overseas plants,
concluding that not a trace of the cooperative model can be found in them
(Clamp 2000; Errasti 2015). Yet these studies are silent as to why the parent
organizations do not reproduce the cooperative model abroad. By contrast,
Luzarraga (2008) and Flecha and Ngai (2014) looked at Mondragon global
co-op strategies for keeping cooperative values under international expan-
sion and concluded that these co-ops have been able to extend the coopera-
tive model overseas. Three main aspects can be criticized though: First,
their argument is grounded in the partial implementation of some best
practices in a handful of foreign plants, such as the enhancement of infor-
mation mechanisms and employees’ involvement in the work area. Second,
the voices of the workforce at foreign plants are not included or are treated
as passive actors. Third, they focus on some important barriers that hinder
extension of the cooperative model overseas, such as legal constraints and
cultural differences, but overlook the influence of power and interests.
Our empirical analysis addresses the transfer of the core practices that
distinguish WCs, that is, employee share-ownership, profit sharing, and
employee participation in general management (Cheney et al. 2014). We
also examine other HR practices inherent to WCs and more specifically to
the Basque cooperative model, including job security, direct employee par-
ticipation in workplace-level decision making, extended training, and pay
equity (Arando et al. 2011; Lertxundi 2011). In view of the above discussion,
some degree of centralized control is likely to be found in WCs. Moreover,
market pressures are expected to encourage diffusion of practices oriented
to enhance efficiency in the subsidiaries, such as direct employee participa-
tion. Other high-commitment practices (job security, extended training,
and pay equity) may also be the object of diffusion, while being shaped by
market influences, institutions, and politics. Transfer of the core coopera-
tive practices will arguably be constrained by institutional barriers and espe-
cially by issues of power and interests.
The Mondragon Cooperative System and Case Studies
A key feature upon which the Basque governance system is built is associa-
tionalism (Cooke, Uranga, and Etxebarria 1997), based on a long tradition
of organizational democracy and workplace and community participation.
The Mondragon cooperative system is probably the best embodiment of this
institutional setting (see, e.g., Whyte and Whyte 1991). Founded about 60
years ago in the Mondragon valley, these cooperatives started out as small
democratic organizations, with strong roots in the territory and a powerful
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sense of community. MCC has, however, undergone an extraordinary trans-
formation. Globalization pressures have compelled many of its industrial
cooperatives to internationalize since the early 1990s. The MCC’s indus-
trial heart consists of 30 multinational co-ops that control nearly 140 pro-
ductive subsidiaries abroad, all of which are capitalist firms, and about 45
productive subsidiaries in Spain, 30 of which are non-cooperative firms
(Mondragon 2017).
Despite this, cooperative values and practices still guide the functioning
of Mondragon parent co-ops in the Basque Country. As owners, worker-
members receive a share of profits and are involved in decision making in
various ways. They participate in the General Assembly on a one-person/
one-vote basis and can be elected to the Governing Council and the Social
Council (Arando, Gago, Jones, and Kato 2015). Workers also participate at
the shop-floor level, although this involvement is promoted through main-
stream management programs. With the aid of external consulting firms, in
the 1980s and 1990s, MCC global co-ops imported prevailing models of total
quality management (TQM) and lean production from the United States
and Japan (Cheney 2005). Likewise, these co-ops imported the mini-
company system in the early 2000s, which, in a nutshell, is a way of structur-
ing the organization so that each of its units operates as an autonomous
company in which workers make decisions and solve problems at the shop-
floor level. Moreover, internal promotion and job security are also para-
mount in Mondragon (Heras 2014). Dismissal of worker-members is
extremely rare and, when a plant does occasionally close, they are relocated
to other MCC co-ops. Although the bottom–top wage ratio has widened
from 1:3 to 1:8 in some co-ops, it is evident that internal wage differences
are still compressed. Only modest use has been made of performance-
related pay, even for top managers (Arando et al. 2011). Managers and
worker-members receive extensive training not only in technical aspects but
also in cooperative values and social skills, such as leadership and teamwork.
Job security, training, and promotion opportunities are crucial to attract
competent top managers, since such policies offset the comparatively low
salaries for top managers in MCC co-ops (Basterretxea and Albizu 2011).
Meanwhile, a renewed debate about the future of the MCC experience,
motivated by internal self-reflection and greater scholarly scrutiny and criti-
cism, has led in recent years to a search for formulas to extend the coopera-
tive model to the capitalist subsidiaries (Azkarraga, Cheney, and Udaondo
2012). Particularly after approval of the social expansion strategy (Flecha
and Ngai 2014) at the 2003 MCC Cooperative Congress, many Mondragon
co-ops have included the ‘‘cooperativization’’ (meaning diffusion of the
cooperative model) of capitalist subsidiaries as a primary goal in their strat-
egy plans. The aim of this goal is to directly transform the latter into WCs
or, at least, implement the core cooperative practices that typify the Basque
parent companies. Nevertheless, while some projects have been developed
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within the domestic field, advances registered in the case of foreign subsid-
iaries have been significantly more limited.
The household manufacturer Fagor Electrodomesticos and the automo-
tive supplier Fagor Ederlan are prominent examples of these records.
Before it entered into liquidation in October 2013, Electrodomesticos
employed approximately 10,500 workers at 18 plants in Spain, France,
China, Poland, Morocco, and Italy at its height in 2006. Ederlan, meanwhile,
employed 3,600 workers at 16 plants in Spain, China, Brazil, and Slovakia in
2014 (see Table 1 for an overview). Both co-ops have developed cooperativi-
zation initiatives in the domestic field. The subsidiary Edesa was transformed
into a WC in the late 1990s and was integrated as a plant belonging to the
Electrodomesticos parent co-op. In 2004, the employees of the subsidiary
Geyser-Gastech became worker-members of Electrodomesticos, although the
company remained a subsidiary. Meanwhile, the subsidiary Fit Automocio´n
became a cooperative plant of Ederlan in 2006. Victorio Luzuriaga Usurbil is
currently undergoing the same process. And last, Fagor Ederlan Tafalla was
transformed into a mixed cooperative1 in 2008, and the employees became
members of the new cooperative subsidiary.
Data and Methods
To address the questions raised earlier, we designed a qualitative empirical
study on Ederlan and Electrodomesticos following the methodology of
contemporary case studies (Yin 2013). We chose them because both
have been cutting-edge co-ops in developing internationalization strategies
and extending the cooperative model to their subsidiaries. Although
Electrodomesticos went bankrupt in 2013 (see Errasti, Bretos, and Nunez
2017 for a detailed study of the co-op’s closure), its analysis is useful to shed
light on contemporary tensions surrounding the transfer of the cooperative
model overseas.
In Fagor Electrodomesticos, the study focused on the cooperative HQ,
the Polish subsidiary Fagor Mastercook, and the French plants of the subsid-
iary Fagor Brandt. In Fagor Ederlan, we analyzed the cooperative HQ, the
Chinese subsidiary Fagor Ederlan Auto-Parts Kunshan, the Brazilian subsid-
iary Fagor Ederlan Brasileira, and the Slovak subsidiary Fagor Ederlan
Slovensko. We selected these foreign subsidiaries because they play different
roles in their respective groups, and the countries where they are based rep-
resent varied institutional profiles, which offer a fairly broad picture to illus-
trate the factors influencing the transfer of employment practices. We also
analyzed the Spanish subsidiary Fagor Ederlan Tafalla, located in Navarre, a
region adjacent to the Basque Country, because its recent conversion into a
1A mixed cooperative is a formula found in some Spanish regions. It differs from a regular co-op as
minority shareholders have voting rights at the general assembly based on their capital contributions.
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WC sheds light on the challenges involved in the cooperativization of for-
eign plants.
Data collection was based on various methods. First, we used archival
methods to build a more contextualized and historically grounded case (Yin
2013). We consulted academic literature dealing with Mondragon, material
gathered on the companies’ webpages, in-house magazines, items from
media archives, and published interviews. We also had access to a range of
internal documentation furnished by both cooperatives and dating from
the early 1990s onward (e.g., strategic plans and management plans, sustain-
ability reports, and statutes). A total of 75 semi-structured interviews aver-
aging 90 minutes each were conducted with worker-members, salaried and
temporary workers, managers, union representatives, and representatives of
the Governing Council and the Social Council. In Ederlan, we conducted
23 interviews between 2012 and 2015, including at the parent company (5),
Fagor Ederlan Tafalla (7), Fagor Ederlan Auto-Parts Kunshan (7), and
Fagor Ederlan Slovensko (4). Although we did not have the opportunity to
visit Fagor Ederlan Brasileira, this subsidiary was extensively discussed in the
interviews. In Electrodomesticos we carried out 52 interviews between 2005
and 2012 at the parent company (25), Fagor Mastercook (16), and the
French plants of Fagor Brandt (11). The field study also drew on direct
observation (Patton 2002). We visited all the plants accompanied by a per-
son in charge (generally a senior manager from the HR department), tour-
ing the management offices and the shop floors. We were also allowed to
attend some meetings of managers and expatriates.
Interviews with managers from HQs placed emphasis on the internationa-
lization of these co-ops, the strategic role of each subsidiary, the dynamics
of control/autonomy in HQ-subsidiary relations, and the extension of the
cooperative model overseas. Interviews with the workers focused on govern-
ance and employment relations issues within the co-ops, and the challenges
they perceived in the cooperativization of foreign subsidiaries. Meanwhile, the
interviews at Tafalla mainly contrasted the views of managers, workers, and
unions regarding the cooperativization of this plant and discussed the options
for replicating this experience abroad. The interviews with managers of for-
eign subsidiaries dealt with the differences between HQs and subsidiaries in
managing labor, autonomy, and policy discretion in relation with foreign
plants; the role of managerial expatriates in introducing HQ’s practices; the
local response to transfer; and the possibilities of implementing the coopera-
tive model. The key focus of the interviews with employees and union repre-
sentatives at overseas plants was industrial relations and working conditions.
We also raised questions about their social identity and sense of belonging to
the company, views about the parent co-op and managerial expatriates, reac-
tions to imposed practices, and willingness to work under the WC formula.
Interviews were primarily carried out in Spanish, Basque, English, and
French, languages spoken by one or several of the authors, although Polish
and Chinese were also used by a few of our respondents (in these cases we
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had the help of an English interpreter). We dismissed the option of translat-
ing the material into one single language at an early stage of the research
because of the problems associated with misinterpretation and mistransla-
tion, and the impossibility of achieving exact equivalence between different
languages (Chidlow, Plakoyiannaki, and Welch 2014). Because of these con-
ditions, we did not employ computer-aided software for analyzing the inter-
view data. Instead, as proposed by Geary and Aguzzoli (2016), we conducted
a qualitative form of content analysis. Given the scarce research in the area,
content analysis was based on an inductive approach whereby patterns and
categories are allowed to flow from the raw data rather than through appli-
cation of theory-driven constructs (Patton 2002). This process was iterative
and involved moving among data, emerging patterns, and the relevant litera-
ture until the data were distilled into adequate conceptual themes
(Eisenhardt 1989). Three main themes emerged: the internationalization
strategy and organizational architecture of Mondragon co-ops; the manage-
ment of labor in subsidiaries; and the cooperativization of subsidiaries. Once
this stage was completed, the key materials were translated into English and
proofread by a native-speaker specialist.
Key Research Findings
The Multi-Localization Strategy and Organizational Architecture
of Mondragon Global Co-ops
Mondragon WCs operating in highly globalized sectors have been pushed
to internationalize since the mid-’90s in order to maintain their competitive-
ness and to safeguard jobs in the Basque plants. Mondragon co-ops back
foreign direct investment, rather than seeking low labor costs overseas, pri-
marily because of their need to follow their manufacturing clients abroad as
suppliers, or simply to become large enough to compete. The distinguish-
ing feature is that international expansion is rooted in the multi-localization
strategy, which implies that the new business activity opened up abroad does
not involve the closure of any pre-existing activity at home. Therefore,
unlike the offshoring model practiced by many of their competitors, the
MCC co-ops expand without closure of plants and job losses in the Basque
Country. In the words of the Fagor Ederlan Group chairman:
Our competitors have offshored some assembly lines, chiefly to Eastern Europe
and Asia, but this is not in our DNA. We are located in these regions as well, but
we follow a multi-localization strategy aimed at maintaining and creating coop-
erative jobs here. In addition, when we locate in a place, it is for the long term
and to generate employment, reinvest profits, and to promote local economic
development there.
Equally, several cooperative members linked their social embeddedness
in the region and rights in decision making with the maintenance of jobs.
As an Electrodomesticos worker-member emphasized:
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In other companies, workers can’t decide on their jobs. If the production is
moved abroad and your plant is closed, the decision isn’t up to you. It is even
likely to be taken by a person who lives thousands of miles away. . . . Here [in
the co-op], solidarity and local commitment are signs of identity. We all know
each other; we live in surrounding villages, and it’s us who make the decisions.
So, nobody is going to vote for that. It would be like signing your own dismissal
or that of your coworkers, relatives, and friends.
In general terms, multi-localization has furnished the MCC co-ops with
extraordinary economic results, while favoring the creation of employment
both in the Basque Country and abroad, and it has enabled them to cope
satisfactorily with the recession. For instance, employment increased in the
whole Fagor Ederlan Group from 1,312 workers in 1999 to almost 3,600
workers in 2014, and the number of workers in the parent co-op also rose
from 1,452 to 1,641 between 2003 and 2008.2 This pattern was not so evi-
dent with Electrodomesticos. Although the multi-localization strategy
helped the co-op weather the early recession years by counteracting the fall
in domestic demand for appliances and high labor costs in Spain, before its
collapse in 2013, only 5,500 workers remained in the group (just half of the
total workforce in 2006). Of these, 1,900 were in the Basque Country.
Notwithstanding that outcome, Electrodomesticos and the Mondragon
cooperative system have proved capable of dealing with this crisis situation
with innovative, local job-sensitive solutions. For instance, instead of closing
the Fagor-Brandt plants in Lyon (France) and Verolanuova (Italy) and mak-
ing all the workers redundant, Electrodomesticos, in an agreement with the
unions, transferred these plants to external business groups rather than sell
them, thus saving most of the jobs. Even though the co-op did not retain a
stake in these companies, it provided resources and know-how to help with
the transition. As the HR director at Electrodomesticos said, ‘‘We prefer
spending money in ways that enable jobs to be maintained before spending
on compensation due to closure.’’ Equally, today all the Electrodomesticos
worker-members affected by its bankruptcy have been given a solution, pri-
marily through early retirement and their relocation to other Mondragon
co-ops.
Ederlan’s HR director clearly depicted the philosophy underlying the
commitment to local jobs as follows:
In Mondragon we only close plants when there is no choice, trying to save the
jobs both at home and abroad. . . . If one co-op goes through difficulties, the
others try to help. This is part of our philosophy. . . . We have designed a plan to
absorb about 200 Electrodomesticos worker-members in our co-op. This is
hardly conceivable in other conventional multinationals.
2This increase responds partly to the integration of the Basque subsidiary Fit Automocio´n as a coop-
erative plant of Ederlan in 2006, with the consequent incorporation of 90 employees as worker-members
of the parent co-op.
12 ILR REVIEW
Nonetheless, the fundamental contradiction lies in the fact that foreign
subsidiaries are established as capitalist firms. Therefore, unlike the coop-
erative members of the Basque parent companies, workers have no stakes
in the firm’s capital, profit distribution, election of the governing bodies,
nor in its general management. In 2007 only 36% were worker-members
in the Fagor Ederlan Group, a similar percentage found in Fagor
Electrodomesticos. These multinational cooperatives have, therefore, been
transformed into what we might term ‘‘coopitalist’’ hybrids comprising a
cooperative core (parent company) and a capitalist periphery (subsidiaries).
Regarding HQ–subsidiary relations, it is evident that the parent co-ops try
to exert centralized control over foreign subsidiaries. First, they tend to
retain the most technologically advanced processes and high value-added
activities, such as product design, R&D, and so on, at the Basque plants. A
top manager at Ederlan admitted the prevalence of the parent’s interests
over those of foreign subsidiaries in the following terms:
The aim [of internationalization] is to maintain cooperative employment in the
plants in the Basque Country, while we create employment and wealth abroad.
Obviously, this means we will take strategic decisions with this in mind, thereby
holding on to key resources and activities with the greatest added value in our
plants.
Second, foreign subsidiaries have very restricted autonomy in strategic,
technical, financial, and commercial aspects, which are areas usually man-
aged by expatriates or managers very close to the parent. Comments such
as ‘‘key decisions are made in the Basque Country’’ were ubiquitous among
the subsidiaries’ local workforce. This trend is also evident in the field of
labor management, in which the policy discretion of foreign subsidiaries is
generally constrained. Mondragon co-ops tend to combine the exercise of
direct control by establishing HR policies in the subsidiaries with indirect
mechanisms based on monitoring by way of expatriate personnel and com-
munication between HQ and key managers in foreign plants.
The Management of Labor in Mondragon’s Foreign Subsidiaries
Mondragon co-ops have implemented similar work organization practices
and direct participation mechanisms at all the foreign subsidiaries. Variable
pay schemes have also been introduced overseas, though these are decoupled
from the Basque cooperative model. By contrast, there are marked differences
as regards job security, training, internal promotion, pay equity, and collective
employee voice. In sum, the bundle of practices associated with the coopera-
tive model has been implemented overseas in a fragmented and inconsistent
way, taking stronger root in some plants than in others.
Regardless of the host country, Ederlan and Electrodomesticos have
implemented abroad the practices associated with production systems and
work organization that resemble those of the Basque plants, thus suggesting
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a greater weight of market influences over institutional factors in this area
of employment practice. To meet global market requirements in their
respective sectors, both co-ops have replicated the same lean production
techniques and mini-company system at all their plants. This upward
problem-solving system entails considerable teamwork and horizontal com-
munication. Production meetings between management and labor are held
on a regular basis, so consultation and information sharing concerning pro-
duction and technical aspects are prominent. In broader terms, suggestion
systems exist for employees to voice their concerns. Ederlan and
Electrodomesticos have also introduced variable pay schemes in all their
subsidiaries, though these are not based on profit sharing or share-
ownership schemes, as is the case of the Basque co-ops, but rather on
performance-related reward schemes that are characteristic of global best
practices. Rewards are linked to productivity and quality for blue-collar
workers and to periodically established objectives for senior managers. The
introduction of these practices undoubtedly answers the need to attain
some internal consistency among the dispersed multinational units, and
achieve the goals of improved productivity through the implementation of
variable pay schemes and managerially driven forms of participation that
are exclusively focused on the workplace and assessed in terms of employee
motivation and commitment to managerial objectives.
HQ managers also emphasized the interest of the co-ops in encouraging
extensive training, internal promotion, job security, and pay equity abroad.
Yet distinguishable patterns concerning introduction of these high-
commitment practices are evident, influenced by the interplay of markets,
institutions, and politics. First, differences according to international divi-
sion of labor are prominent, which reflects a variation on market influences
shaped by product- and labor-market contingencies. Fagor Ederlan
Slovensko carries out production processes of a more labor-intensive and
low value-added nature and operates with less-sophisticated technology, at
least in comparison with other Ederlan units. This circumstance translates
into a strategic HRM approach that focuses to a greater degree on tight
work monitoring and cost minimization, placing weaker emphasis on train-
ing, pay equity, and job security. Some workers pointed out that training is
scarce and takes place ‘‘on the job,’’ and that the harsh management style
translated into high work pressure, among other effects. Numerical flexibil-
ity in the form of temporary contracts is also more prominent in this plant,
which contributes to a significant annual employee turnover that usually
exceeds 25%.
Although the Chinese and Brazilian subsidiaries play an important role
in Ederlan’s global value chain, marked differences concern the manage-
ment of labor between both, which can be chiefly explained by variations
on institutional distance. Considerable institutional distance is involved with
the former; some institutional similarity is evident with the latter. Ederlan’s
Chinese subsidiary, set up as a greenfield project in Kunshan Industrial
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Park, is a mini replica of the parent’s most technologically advanced site in
the Basque Country. Consequently, the requirement for a stable and skilled
workforce with specialist knowledge pressures Ederlan to encourage exten-
sive training, job security, and employee involvement. Although the plant
was opened recently, advances in such policies have been restricted to an
elite group of local managers and workers. The high dynamism of the labor
market in Kunshan was regarded at Ederlan HQ as a major challenge for
promoting extended training, internal promotion, and pay equity.
(Workers vote with their feet by job-hopping, and dismissal is extremely sim-
ple due to the limited labor protection and the absence of unions.)
Likewise, several managers emphasized the obstacles to stimulating
employee participation in this plant, caused by the lack of creative, partici-
patory, and teamwork skills among workers in Kunshan, which seems to
stem from the historically rooted hierarchical style of management in
Chinese firms (Gamble 2003).
By contrast, Fagor Ederlan Brasileira stands out for integrating several
practices closely related to the parent co-op’s model. This subsidiary has
introduced some of the social equity policies that characterize Ederlan:
Careers are divided into six categories, and for each of them a salary scale is
established and a series of labor training objectives are defined. Employees
also enjoy social benefits that include health insurance, luncheon vouchers,
and transport. Likewise, an egalitarian wage policy has been introduced,
reducing the wage gap from 1:27 in 2005 (Luzarraga 2008) to the current
1:18. These and other labor conditions are reviewed on an annual basis
under agreement with unions to keep them at levels higher than the local
firms. Ederlan’s internal promotion policies have also been implemented,
which, in combination with extensive training in technical and social skills,
has drastically curbed employee turnover. Ederlan managers attributed the
progress made in the Brazilian subsidiary both to its location in a favorable
institutional setting and to the fact that this is their longest-running foreign
subsidiary. They put the focus on the willingness of the subsidiary’s employ-
ees to participate in the company, as well as on their receptiveness to valu-
ing social goals and creating egalitarian relationships based on personal
closeness in the workplace, all of which are salient features of the Brazilian
NBS (Mellahi, Frynas, and Collings 2016).
Meanwhile, labor relations in the Fagor Electrodomesticos Group were
marked by the difficult financial situation that the co-op underwent from
the early 2000s and the growing pressures in the appliance industry to com-
pete on price. Hence, market influences urged Electrodomesticos to pursue
a low-road approach to HRM in their subsidiaries, especially after the out-
break of the financial crisis in 2008, although this was modulated in each
foreign subsidiary by variations relating to institutional factors and politics.
In the case of the French subsidiary Brandt, Electrodomesticos HQ tried
to implement a hard adjustment policy aimed at enhancing economic per-
formance by reducing labor costs from the very beginning. This included
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layoffs and wage cuts, the greater use of temporary jobs, lower training
opportunities, and higher work pressure on the assembly line. Yet the local
workforce showed notable resistance to these impositions by deploying
power resources from the institutional context and their collective organiza-
tion. The large size of the subsidiary, the highly regulated labor market in
France (with a solid labor legislation that grants substantial bargaining
power to unions), the long-standing union culture in Brandt, and its ability
to exert pressure on public opinion and the French government were high-
lighted by HQ management as major hindrances to execution of the
planned restructuring. Some salient examples are the various stoppages and
strikes in protest against restructuration measures, and the 1.2% wage
increase under collective agreement in the French plants in 2009, just at
the time when the Basque worker-members reduced their salary by 8% to
withstand the economic downturn. These signs of resistance did not, how-
ever, prevent restructuring. In practice, labor involvement in corporate
decision making is relatively low in France, and unions have access to little
effective information and monitoring rights (Goyer and Hancke´ 2005). As a
Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale du Travail (CGT) delegate stressed, ‘‘restructuring
was carried out behind our backs, ignoring workers’ social and labor
demands, amidst a continuous struggle to get information.’’
The Polish subsidiary Mastercook yields a more complex picture, with a
first phase of restructuring under agreement with unions; a second phase in
which some cooperative practices were introduced in line with the plant’s
new role within the division of labor (although transfer was shaped by insti-
tutions); and a third phase in which a new restructuring plan encountered
greater local resistance. Overall, of the Electrodomesticos foreign plants,
Mastercook advanced the most in the introduction of the cooperative
model. A prominent example is the inclusion of two trade union represen-
tatives on the subsidiary’s board of directors, which stands out as a unique
experience in MCC in promoting representative participation overseas
beyond legal requirements. Nevertheless, this circumstance also seems to
respond to calculated reasoning at HQ. As the HR director pointed out,
‘‘We encountered a highly unproductive and bureaucratized plant . . . and
the presence of the union representatives aided the restructuring that was
needed.’’ Restructuring involved downsizing from 1,700 to 1,200 jobs
between 1999 and 2003, along with a balancing of the proportion between
blue-collar and white-collar workers. However, most workers had been rein-
stated by 2008.
Parallel to the increasingly strategic role that Mastercook gained after
2003 by introducing production lines that were unprofitable in Spain, self-
management was encouraged through semi-autonomous work teams, train-
ing opportunities were promoted, wage differentials were restricted, and
employee turnover was reduced. However, organizational change was to
face subtle hindrances. With 45 years of a centralized economic system
behind them, Polish employees tended to disapprove of changes by
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displaying silent resistance (Hurt and Hurt 2005). We observed this beha-
vior in aspects such as high absenteeism and the fact that workers com-
monly recognized their lack of sense of belonging to the company. As an
expatriate HR manager stressed, ‘‘It’s impossible to introduce the exact
same parent HRM model here,’’ ascribing it to ‘‘the meaning of job stability
is absolutely different; workers don’t take responsibility for their job and the
company.’’ The financial crisis in 2008 opened a new phase of restructuring
with layoffs, wage cuts, and harsh industrial disputes, amid intense micro-
political struggles. A critical event involved the call for strike action by the
left-wing union Sierpen-80 to ‘‘protest the super-exploitation measures and
demand a wage increase of e300,’’ as a union leader claimed. The
Electrodomesticos board response was a threat of shutdown, forcing the
subsidiary to surrender. In the words of the same interviewee, ‘‘[HQ] man-
agement settled the dispute with the threat of relocating the plant to
Ukraine or Russia.’’
Cooperativization of Foreign Subsidiaries
As we have seen, Mondragon global co-ops have implemented certain
employment practices closely linked to the cooperative model in some for-
eign subsidiaries. Equally evident, however, is that no foreign subsidiary has
been transformed into a WC or has introduced comprehensively the core
cooperative practices (i.e., employee participation in ownership, profit shar-
ing, and general management). Although institutions are an important part
of the story in understanding why the core of the cooperative model is not
transferred overseas, issues of power and politics seem to play a more criti-
cal role.
In the managerial technostructure of the MCC co-ops, allusions to institu-
tional factors are ubiquitous. The principal barriers mentioned include that,
in the destination country, either no legislation on WCs has been developed
or the legislation in place bears no similarity to that of the Basque Country.
Our respondents echoed this regulatory institutional distance; for instance,
regarding the case of China, this country lacks legislation specifically cover-
ing WCs. At the same time, the possibility of creating a European
Cooperative Society (ECS) has not been explored in any of the foreign
plants located in Europe. Although this step suggests a plausible solution
that would overcome the regulatory institutional distance that stands in
the way of transforming the European subsidiaries into WCs, an
Electrodomesticos manager simply regarded it as ‘‘unreal,’’ arguing that
‘‘the current economic conditions are not adequate, nor are the social con-
ditions in the plants,’’ and that ‘‘there is no interest from the workers and
unions in becoming a cooperative.’’ The company unions in Poland and
France claimed, however, that nobody had ever proposed creating an ECS.
The other pillar of the discourse employed by the managerial technos-
tructure to illustrate the complexity in the cooperativization of overseas
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plants is the possible lack of a cooperative and participatory culture among
workers in foreign subsidiaries, not to mention the constraints against over-
coming this barrier, such as high turnover rates and the employees’ lack of
a sense of belonging to the company. This attitude is particularly visible in
the case of the Chinese subsidiary, where workers showed difficulties in
properly interpreting the core cooperative practices because of their unfa-
miliarity with participative decision making and share ownership schemes.
Workers expressed their reluctance to work under a cooperative formula.
In broader terms, a manager from Ederlan Tafalla had this to say when
asked about the prospect of encouraging employee participation in owner-
ship, general management, and profit sharing overseas:
In many countries where we are located there is not a rooted cooperative cul-
ture. You can’t make a copy-and-paste of our model. . . . [Setting up a co-op] is a
long process that needs to follow some steps: promote workers’ autonomy to
make decisions, support their progressive access to ownership, and instill a cor-
porate cooperative culture. . . . This implies huge work in training workers in
these values and practices, and it’s impossible to carry this out without a stable
and committed workforce.
Parent co-ops’ efforts to promote a more cooperativist culture in foreign
subsidiaries seem rather limited though, even in sites involving a relatively
less marked institutional distance. In this regard, local members in the
European subsidiaries commonly highlighted the MCC co-ops’ lack of inter-
est in instilling cooperative-like organizational values and offering workers
the opportunity to become cooperative members. For instance, with refer-
ence to the French subsidiary Brandt, a CGT trade union representative
pointed out that ‘‘we didn’t have any cooperative training and nobody
talked to us about the Mondragon model; they just talked about productiv-
ity improvements.’’
The project whereby Ederlan studied the legal conversion of its Brazilian
subsidiary into a cooperative is probably the best embodiment of how
Mondragon co-ops have instrumentalized the role of institutional factors to
legitimize the non-cooperativization of foreign plants. According to HQ
management, the project never got off the ground because of legal impedi-
ments and cultural differences. As the Fagor Ederlan Group chairman
explained:
In Brazil we analyzed the possibilities of transforming a plant into a mixed coop-
erative, but the differences between our cooperative legislations prevented us
from going ahead with the project. . . . Moreover, co-ops are understood very dif-
ferently [in Brazil]; I think they are perceived more negatively.
Yet, it is evident that the Brazilian business system, with well-developed
legislation on WCs, and a strongly rooted cooperative culture in the south-
eastern region (Lemaıˆtre 2013) where the subsidiary is located, offered sup-
portive conditions for transforming this plant into a WC. According to some
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in-house studies, Brazilian employees showed substantial willingness to
become a Mondragon co-op as well (Luzarraga 2008). Some interviewees
who witnessed the project firsthand confirmed off the record that there
were no insurmountable barriers to transformation of the subsidiary, and
that the underlying reason was the impossibility of setting up a mixed
cooperative—a formula whereby, in practice, the parent co-op preserves the
majority of the stakes and retains decision-making power through its pres-
ence in the governing bodies of the subsidiary.
This example illustrates how diffusion in multinational co-ops is critically
played out at the micro-political level, influenced by HQ-subsidiary power
relations and by core organizational actors in the HQ looking to protect
their own interests. The co-ops are reluctant to lose control over all their
business groups by promoting worker participation in ownership and giving
greater autonomy to the subsidiaries, as they think that might be detrimen-
tal for the viability of the Basque plants. An Ederlan manager explained:
If, say, the Chinese or Slovakian subsidiary became cooperatives and had full
decision-making autonomy, no one can guarantee us that they will remain in
the group [Fagor Ederlan], and this produces uncertainty about the viability
and survival of our cooperative.
An Electrodomesticos worker-member put forward a related idea:
Taken to the extreme, the Fagor Brandt and Fagor Mastercook workers might
be a majority and, for instance, decide to close the Mondragon plants.
Our fieldwork also found a perception among the managers and worker-
members of the parent companies that workers at the foreign subsidiaries
would not develop as strong an identity and commitment to cooperative val-
ues and the company as their own. This perspective seems to stem from the
lack of relations, links, and trust between the parent company and foreign
subsidiaries. A clear example of this disunity and lack of understanding is
the absence of a European Works Council (EWC) through which workers
in the European Union have a right to information and consultation
regarding company decisions at the European level. As a union representa-
tive of a French Electrodomesticos plant complained:
The Fagor parent company has a clearly laissez-faire attitude. No EWC or similar
body has been created to let workers participate in decisions about the com-
pany, or to encourage relations between the parent company and the subsidiary.
Ultimately, this perception generates uncertainty among managers and
worker-members about the success of a hypothetical cooperativization
arrangement in a foreign subsidiary, as it might put job security at risk in
the Basque plants. This concern was pervasive in the interviews. An Ederlan
worker-member described the picture like this:
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We have no contact with the workers in the foreign subsidiaries. In other plants
that have been turned into WCs here, like the one at Tafalla, we did maintain a
closer relationship. . . . I think it’s difficult for a cooperativization project to be
successful in a foreign subsidiary. You don’t acquire cooperative values over-
night. What’s more, I don’t think they [the workers in the foreign subsidiaries]
are going to develop an identity and take on such a solid commitment to the
company as ours is with Fagor Ederlan. At the end of the day, if the cooperativi-
zation of a foreign subsidiary is not successful, it affects us all.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article was motivated by calls to analyze the multinational expansion of
WCs and the diffusion of the cooperative model to foreign subsidiaries
(McMurtry and Reed 2009; Cheney et al. 2014; Bretos and Marcuello 2017).
Regarding the first research question, our findings reveal that Mondragon
co-ops internationalize as a defensive strategy to safeguard the local jobs of
worker-members. Solidarity values and moral arguments among workers,
their involvement in corporate decision making, and their local roots in the
co-op’s home region prevent offshoring and prompt more sustainable pat-
terns of international expansion capable of protecting local jobs. Whereas
much of the previous literature operates on the assumption that the deci-
sion about offshoring production depends exclusively on economic calcula-
tions (see Schro¨der 2013 for a detailed critique), our findings extend extant
knowledge by demonstrating that rank-and-file participation in manage-
ment and the social embeddedness of decision makers at the home location
also shape the choice of how firms internationalize.
Unlike previous studies (MacLeod and Reed 2009; Luzarraga and Irizar
2012), this article highlights how internationalization can transform the
organizational architecture of co-ops and intensify the pressures to drift
away from their hallmark practices, thus adding new flesh to ongoing
debates about the challenges that WCs face to maintain their economic via-
bility under market globalization pressures while staying true to their coop-
erative values and practices (e.g., Atzeni 2012; Flecha and Ngai 2014; Heras
2014). Multinational expansion has transformed MCC co-ops into coopital-
ist hybrids composed of a cooperative HQ and a capitalist periphery (subsid-
iaries) in which cooperative membership rights are restricted for workers. It
is evident that the interests of the Basque worker-members prevail over
those of peripheral employees overseas in terms of jobs, the manufacturing
of high value-added products, R&D, and so on. Indeed, HQ–subsidiary rela-
tionships in MCC co-ops are far from the federative models expected to be
found in multinational WCs, evoking instead the global typology of MNCs
identified by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998), in which the HQ attempts to cen-
tralize decision-making power and strategic capabilities.
Regarding the second research question, our findings show how this
organizational architecture shapes the nature of transfer across the multina-
tional network. MCC co-ops have transferred similar work organization
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practices and direct employee voice mechanisms to all their subsidiaries,
with notable application of teamwork, information sharing, and labor–
management communication at the shop-floor level. Variable pay schemes
have been introduced overseas, although these are dissociated from the
home-region model. The co-ops have implemented certain practices closely
linked to the cooperative model in some plants (including extensive train-
ing, job security, and pay equity) while, at the same time, pursuing a low-
road approach to HRM in others. Meanwhile, no foreign plant has been
transformed into a WC, nor has it introduced the core cooperative practices
(employee participation in ownership, profit sharing, and general manage-
ment). Overall, these results have some parallels to those for German-
owned MNCs, which have been found to uphold their model of employee
participation based on codetermination and extensive consultation in
home-based operations while embracing abroad HR practices patterned on
the individualistic cost-minimizing Anglo-Saxon approach, including the use
of direct participation mechanisms and numerical flexibility (Ferner and
Varul 2000; Meardi et al. 2009).
Our research deconstructs this pattern of transfer by drawing on insights
from market-based, institutionalist, and political perspectives. Thus, this arti-
cle is situated within a reduced set of studies that have provided fine-
grained evidence of how diffusion across borders is shaped by the interre-
lated influence of market pressures, the macro-political terrain of the MNC
(the home and host countries’ institutions, and the subsidiaries’ back-
ground, pattern of industrial relations, mode of establishment, age, size,
and place in the international division of labor), and micro-political rela-
tions grounded in the actors’ interests and power resources (e.g., Edwards
et al. 2007; Ferner et al. 2012; Geary and Aguzzoli 2016).
First, homogeneity in practices associated with production systems and
work organization across different national divides is consistent with some
studies showing that this area of employment practice is largely shaped by
market influences rather than by institutions (e.g., Meardi et al. 2009). It
seems that rather than drawing on local knowledge and practices,
Mondragon co-ops have imported mainstream regimes of managerialism
and productivity from hegemonic NBSs, in the form of prevailing models of
total quality management TQM, lean production techniques, and semi-
autonomous work groups (Cheney 2005), which they are now trying to
enforce in their foreign plants to meet the market pressures toward world-
class productivity and quality imposed in their sectors. The introduction of
performance-related reward schemes worldwide appears to be influenced
by the need to be competitive in pay terms in the international markets,
since the pay policies that typify the Basque co-ops (with salaries for top
managers that are usually below the average) may make it difficult to attract
and retain competent managers abroad. This trend illustrates how remu-
neration is also prone to be informed by global best practices (Ferner and
Varul 2000).
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Second, the marked differences on training and skill formation, internal
promotion, job security, and pay equity are explained by variations in mar-
ket influences, institutional distance, and power resources, whose relative
weight depends on the context of each subsidiary. Comparison of the
Slovak and Chinese subsidiaries reveals how the subsidiary’s role within the
international division of labor shapes the HRM orientation (Wilkinson et al.
2001). At the same time, comparison of the Brazilian and Chinese subsidiar-
ies verifies that institutional distance plays a mediating role in transfer, as
contended by neo-institutionalists (Kostova 1999). Moreover, the political
terrain that pervades multinational co-ops, which has been found to diverge
considerably from the harmonious terrain that extant theory would suggest,
is also an important part of the story. There is evidence of subsidiaries’
actors drawing on power resources from the macro-political settings in
which they operate to resist HQ’s impositions (Geary and Aguzzoli 2016), as
the French subsidiary Brandt illustrates. Nevertheless, the co-ops play an
important role in setting or influencing subsidiaries’ employment policy by
combining direct control with indirect control through expatriation.
Third, the non-transfer of the core cooperative practices is consistent
with the fact that host-country effects are more visible on employee partici-
pation practices (Meardi et al. 2009), hence corroborating the expected
role of institutions in shaping diffusion within co-ops. Yet our research
argues for a more pronounced emphasis on issues of power and interests,
as supported by the non-cooperativization of the Brazilian subsidiary despite
suitable institutional conditions. The underlying reasons also bring to light
a distinctive pattern in diffusion. As noted by Chiang, Leman´ski, and Birtch
(2017), the previous literature has overlooked cases in which it is risky to
share certain HR practices or may entail losses to the transferring unit. In
this regard, our findings illustrate an uncommon coalition in MCC MNCs
between HQ management and worker-members to avoid genuine coopera-
tivization of the foreign plants, as they deem it detrimental for their control
over the business group and risky for the viability of the co-op, thereby gen-
erating a dilemma for the ultimate objective of internationalization in
Mondragon: keeping cooperative jobs at the Basque plants.
An important limitation of this exploratory study may lie in the generaliz-
ability of our findings. Future research might therefore investigate other
patterns in the management of labor within multinational co-ops operating
in different industries and national settings. Likewise, a more detailed analy-
sis of how practices evolve at different stages of the transfer process, placing
emphasis on how these are implemented, integrated, and internalized in
the subsidiaries (Chiang et al. 2017), may shed further light on the chal-
lenges surrounding the diffusion of employment practices within multina-
tional co-ops.
This article also suggests some practical implications to facilitate the
extension of the cooperative model. First, cooperativization projects in for-
eign subsidiaries should adapt to their own institutional contexts and
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integrate within them the perspectives of the workers, since there are differ-
ent legislative and cultural approaches to co-ops worldwide (Borzaga and
Spear 2004). Then again, the setting up of WCs is a bottom-up process, so
HQ can only supply the means to carry this out in foreign plants, not
impose it. A crucial step is to move toward federative models that endow
the subsidiaries with greater autonomy and decision-making power. This
move should be accompanied by the strengthening of social capital through
trust-based relationships between HQ and subsidiaries, which is essential to
lubricate the transfer of employment practices within MNCs (Bjo¨rkman and
Lervik 2007). At the parent co-op, this can create a greater determination
to transfer the cooperative model’s core practices. Equally, the subsidiary’s
trust in the HQ enormously facilitates acceptance of the practices trans-
ferred (Kostova 1999). Last, cooperativization should be preceded by educa-
tion and training in cooperative values and practices at foreign subsidiaries.
Otherwise, the transfer could fail owing to a clash with the host country’s
cognitive institutions, as workers might have difficulties in correctly inter-
preting such practices.
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